Next to some minor yet relevant and highly complex questions, such as those about the legitimacy of negotiations between companies and unions, the fundamental points of the collective bargaining Decreto-Ley (a type of norm that functions as law, which is usually approved by government without congressional approval) sanctioned on June 10 are related to the role of the firm settlements, settlement validity and internal flexibility.
Of the three, the impression that legislative intervention has been left behind is a matter of want and not ability.
In the case of firm settlements, the Decreto-Ley wants to send the right message: it is not something else to dedicate the prevalence of what is agreed on in upper levels of industry. But it seems that it cannot carry out this message to its logical ends.
The regulation is certainly confused. From the text of article 84, 1 LET, it seems that only at an interprofessional level or by agreement from firms, the state, regional and autonomous governments would the firm settlement affect the issues at hand ? issues that extend in scope beyond the firms.
Nonetheless, the second paragraph of article 84 seems to support what the firms would prefer to see. An agreement by the state or autonomous government would reach a contrary end.
